The Honorable Discharge: A Farewell to Responsibility for War Crimes? by Boohar, Charles W., Jr.
William & Mary Law Review
Volume 12 | Issue 4 Article 9
The Honorable Discharge: A Farewell to
Responsibility for War Crimes?
Charles W. Boohar Jr.
Copyright c 1971 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Repository Citation
Charles W. Boohar Jr., The Honorable Discharge: A Farewell to Responsibility for War Crimes?, 12 Wm.
& Mary L. Rev. 878 (1971), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol12/iss4/9
THE HONORABLE DISCHARGE: A FAREWELL TO
RESPONSIBILITY FOR WAR CRIMES?
On March 16, 1968, Company C, 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry con-
ducted a military operation which allegedly degenerated into a mas-
sacre of the noncombatant populace of a South Vietnamese village
known as My Lai(4). 1 The alleged massacre was not revealed until
after some twenty-two participants had been discharged from the serv-
ice.2 These events triggered a vigorous debate over the effect of sep-
aration from the service upon the exercise of military jurisdiction.' Sub-
sequently, on April 8, 1971, the Department of Defense announced that
because of an apparent lack of jurisdiction there would be no prosecu-
tion of discharged individuals under the Uniform Code of Military
Justice.4
The incident at My Lai(4) has resulted in the arraignment of two
enlisted members, and -the conviction of one officer of Company C,'
all of whom were on active duty in April, 1969, when the facts sur-
rounding the incident were uncovered.6 The failure to prosecute other
alleged participants, some of whom have made what appear to be
dangerous admissionsJ raises serious questions concerning the funda-
mental fairness of the American penal system. Could the criminal lia-
bility of an individual who has committed offenses in the nature of the
alleged My Lai(4) incident turn absolutely upon whether he has been
separated from the service? Could our penal system allow a discharged
former serviceman to expose the misconduct of his compatriots, mis-
conduct of which he, too, was a part, to the accountability of the crim-
inal law while maintaining for himself a position of absolute immunity?8
1. For an extensive journalistic account of these events see S. HERSH, My LAi 4-A
REPORT ON THE MASSACRE AND ITS AFTERmATH 44-75 (1970).
2. 75 NvswEEi, March 23, 1970, at 37.
3. Compare McKenzie, Special War Crimes Panel Weighed to Try Ex-Gi's. Wash-
ington Post, Nov. 27, 1969, at 1, col. 5, with 115 CONG. REc. 39,584 (1969) (remarks of
Senator Young) and 115 CoNG. Rac. 36,344 (1969) (remarks of Senator Young).
4. Chapman, Pentagon Cant Find Way to Prosecute Former Soldiers, Washington
Post, April 9, 1971, at A3, col. 5.
5. United States v. Hutto (Ft. McPherson, Ga. 1971); United States v. Calley (Ft.
Benning, Ga. 1970); United States v. Mitchell (Ft. Hood, Tex. 1970).
6. S. HERSH, supra note 1, at 105-113.
7. See, e.g., 'So I ... Killed 10 or 15,' Washington Post, Nov. 25, 1969, at 1, col. 1.
8. This immunity resulting from an unintended quirk in the penal system is not
to be confused with immunity conferred by a sovereign in order to procure informa-
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It would appear that affirmative answers to these questions, even in view
of the Department of Defense pronouncement, would be offensive to
basic concepts of American justice.
Much of the argument surrounding any assertion of criminal juris-
diction, military or civilian, over former members of Company C, and
similar offenders, necessarily concerns the desirability, in terms of jus-
tice, of punishing American soldiers for crimes against the law of war.
However, for the purposes of this study, this rather abstract desirability
shall be taken as settled national policy.9 This note proposes to examine
the effect of separation from the service upon the assertion of criminal
jurisdiction over former servicemen who, while on active duty, have
committed offenses against the law of war.' 0
don or testimony which might not otherwise be available. The latter form of immunity
when strictly circumscribed and sparingly employed doubtless serves a valid social
purpose.
9. The national policy of mid-19th Century America can be taken from the
following:
All wanton violence committed against persons in the invaded country,
all destruction of property not commanded by the authorized officer, all
robbery, all pillage or sacking even after taking a place by main force,
all rape, wounding, maiming, or killing of such inhabitants, are prohibited
under the penalty of death, or such other severe punishment as may seem
adequate for the gravity of the offence.
A soldier, officer or private, in the act of committing such violence, and
disobeying a superior ordering him to abstain from it, may be lawfully
killfd on the spot by such superior.
Cowles, Universality of Jurisdiction Over War Crimes, 33 CALur. L. Rzv. 177, 201-02
(1945), quoting from F. Lieber, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the
United States in the Field, UNITED STATES WAR DEPT. GENEAI. ORDERS 100, t 44 (Apr.
24, 1863).
Post World War II America reconsidered this problem. The following statement
attributed to Justice Robert Jackson fairly summarizes the national policy of that time:
If certain acts in violation of treaties are crimes, they are crimes whether
the United States does them or whether Germany does them. and we are not
prepared to lay down a rule of criminal conduct against others which we
would be unwilling to invoke against ourselves.
53 SATuRDAY REviEw, July 18, 1970, at 14.
10. It is no objection that Congress in providing for the trial of such offenses has
not itself undertaken to codify that branch of international law or to mark
its precise boundaries, or to enumerate or define by statute all the acts
which that law condemns. . . . Similarly, by the reference in the 15th
Article of War to "offenders or offenses that ... by the law of war may
be triable by such military commissions," Congress has incorporated by
reference, as within the jurisdiction of military commissions, all offenses
which are defined as such by the law of war ... and which may constitu-
tionally be included within that jurisdiction. Congress had the choice of
crystallizing in permanent form and in minute detail every offense against
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JURISDICrION OVER THE PERSON
The English common law and most American jurisdictions have
adopted the territorial theory of criminal jurisdiction. 1 Under this
theory, the states may punish a criminal offender only when the sims
of his crime is within the territorial limits of the state. Thus initially,
it must be concluded that it is not possible to use the criminal sanc-
tions of any state in connection with offenses committed in a foreign
country by former servicemen. The territorial theory would, however,
support an assertion of criminal jurisdiction over these offenders by
the country in which the offenses were committed. However, when
the offenses have been committed in allied countries there is an under-
standable reluctance on their part to prosecute the offender and thereby
to risk creating animosity within the American public. Furthermore,
the former serviceman may evade subjugation to foreign jurisdiction
merely by remaining under the control of the United States where,
presumably, he is immune from extradition.' Therefore, the effect of
this sanction upon former servicemen is minimal.
The United States, as a member of the community of nations, is em-
powered to act in conformity with the recognized customs of nations.' 8
According to these customs, or international law, sovereign nations
may exercise extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction on the basis of any
of four theories.'4 Of these theories, two confer adequate bases for
the law of war, or of adopting the system of common law applied by
military tribunals so far as it should be recognized and deemed applicable
by the courts. It chose the latter course.
Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1942).
11. R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 671 (2d ed. 1969).
12. The Supreme Court has said: "It is well settled that a foreign Army permitted
to march through a friendly country, or to be stationed in it, by permission of its gov-
erment or sovereign, is exempt from the civil and criminal jurisdiction of -the place ......
Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509, 515 (1878). See also Dow v. Johnson, 100 U.S.
158 (1879). But see Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957).
13. The Pacquete Habana-The Lola, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
14. The theories are generally:
(1) Personal-a sovereign may make and enforce rules for the conduct of its
citizens no matter where they may be located.
(2) Protective-a sovereign may exercise criminal jurisdiction whenever the
acts are directed against and affect particular interests of that nation.
(3) Passive Personality-a sovereign may exercise criminal jurisdiction 'on the
basis of the nationality of the victim.
(4) Universal Jurisdiction-any sovereign may exercise jurisdiction over certain
classes of crimes.
See, Jurisdiction 'with Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. N'r'L L. SuPP. 435 (1935).
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the assertion of criminal jurisdiction by the United States over former
servicemen who have committed crimes against the law of war while
serving in foreign countries. First, the personal theory of criminal
jurisdiction maintains that a nation may make and enforce rules for
the conduct of its citizens even when they are outside the territory of
that nation. 5 This theory has been recognized by the United States
as sufficient to support the extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction in
at least two instances: The trial of individuals by consular courts in
certain nations,'6 and the applicability of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice 17 in all places.'8 Additionally, the universal theory of criminal
jurisdiction allows assertion of jurisdiction over certain offenses by any
nation finding the offender within its territory.'9 Although this latter
theory formerly enjoyed general acceptance only with respect to bri-
gands and pirates, there seems to be a growing acceptance of the theory
with respect to offenders against the law of war.20
One of the underlying concepts of justice in America is the feeling
that there can be no punishment for harmful social conduct unless such
punishment was provided for at the time of the offense. Thus any
attempt by Congress to construct a forum for the trial of individuals
who had committed offenses before the enactment of the statute would
be subject to serious, but not necessarily fatal, ex post facto criticism.
It is, therefore, necessary to consider the current jurisdictional grants to
the tribunals which administer the federal criminal law to determine
whether an adequate basis for the assertion of jurisdiction exists.
There is no question that participants in the alleged massacre at My
Lai(4) and similar incidents who are still members of the armed forces
may be prosecuted before military tribunals under the UCMJ.2 But,
this problem is not as easily disposed of in the case of discharged indi-
15. Blaclner v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932).
16. In Re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891). See also Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298
(1922); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904); Hawaii v. Manldchi, 190 U.S. 197
(1903); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
17. 10 U.S.C. § 801-940 (1964) [hereinafter cited as UCMJ].
18. "This chapter applies in all places." UCMJ art. 5, 10 U.S.C. § 805 (1964).
19. C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, CHIEFLY AS INTERPRE AND APPLIED BY THE
UNiTED STATES, 767-77 (2d ed., 1945); 2 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
681 (1941).
20. Cowles, supra note 9, at 216-18.
21. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 3; id. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1.
22. UCMJ art. 2(1), 10 U.S.C. § 802(1) (1964). See, The Law of Land Warfare
§ 506 (United States Dept. of the Army, FM 27-10) (July 18, 1956).
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viduals, whether viewed in the context of the jurisdiction of federal
district courts or United States military tribunals.
At present, federal district courts have no jurisdiction over offenses
committed by citizens of the United States in other nations. 2 Although
the Supreme Court has intimated that the exercise of such jurisdiction
would be constitutionally permissible 4 and the Department of Defense
has recommended that such jurisdiction be granted as a matter of ur-
gency,25 to date Congress has not conferred extraterritorial jurisdiction
upon the federal district courts.2 6
Military tribunals are created by statute and may exercise jurisdiction
only in consonance with that statute. The statute creating military
courts, the Uniform Code of Military Justice, is applicable in all places,
so that military courts may exercise jurisdiction over all offenses no
matter where committed, provided that the accused is a person subject
to the Code. Therefore, an examination of the jurisdictional grant of
the UCMJ is in order.
As a traditional proposition, military jurisdiction over former service-
men has terminated upon discharge from the service. 9 However, in
response to the near escape of the thief of the German crown jewels
after World War II,30 Congress, in 1950, inserted a jurisdiction saving
provision in the UCMJ.31 This provision was subsequently declared
unconstitutional insofar as it purported to subject a former serviceman
23. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3238 (1964).
24. Reid v. Covert 354 U.S. 1, 64 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id., at 76 n.12
(Harlan, J., concurring); id. at 86-87 (Clark, J., dissenting). Cf. Kinsella v. United
States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 245 (1960); United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles,
350 U.S. 11, 21 (1955).
25. Letter from Frank J. Sherlock (Director, Legislative Reference Service, Depart-
ment of Defense, Office of General Counsel), to Wilfred H. Rommel (Assistant Di-
rector for Legislative Reference, Bureau of the Budget), April 15, 1970.
26. Proposals for such action were before the last Congress. S.3188, S.3189, H.R. 4225,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); H.R. 18547, H.R. 18548, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
27. W. WINTHRoP, MILITARY LAW AND PREcEDENTS 86 (2d ed. 1920).
28. UCMJ art. 5, 10 U.S.C. § 805 (1964).
29. Zeigler, The Termination of Jurisdiction over the Person and the Offense, 10
MILITARY L. REv. 139, 144-47 (1960).
30. Hearings on H_?. 2498 Before a Subcom. of the House Comm. on Armed
Services, 81st Cong., 1 Sess., 879-85 (1949). See Durant v. Hiatt, 81 F. Supp. 948 (1948).
See also United States ex reL Hirshberg v. Cooke, 336 U.S. 210, (1949). For other cases
where former servicemen escaped punishment because of this lack of jurisdiction see
Myers & Kaplan, Crime Without Punishment, 35 Gao. L.J. 303, 314-16 (1947)..
31. UCMJ art. 3(a), 10 U.S.C. § 803(a) (1964).
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to military jurisdiction 32 for in service violations of the punitive articles
of the Code.33
Without regard to the above provision, the UCMJ grants jurisdiction
to general courts-martial ". . to try any person who by the law of
war is subject to trial by a military tribunal and may adjudge any pun-
ishment, permitted by the law of war." 34 The phrase any person brings
within the jurisdiction of military tribunals all natural persons of what-
ever nationality or status.3 5 Furthermore, former servicemen accused
of participation in incidents comparable to the alleged incident at My
Lai(4) are accused of "grave breaches" of the Geneva Conventions of
1949.36 The Conventions entitle persons accused of "grave breaches"
to be tried only in a manner comparable to that employed for the ad-
ministration of criminal justice within the armed forces of the accusing
sovereign. 7 Thus, the jurisdictional grant of the UCMJ is sufficiently
broad to encompass former servicemen, since by the basic terms of the
Geneva Conventions they have committed offenses which are triable
by military tribunals.
32. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 US. 11 (1955).
33. The punitive articles state substantive crimes. UCMJ arts. 77-134, 10 U.S.C.
$5 877-934 (1964).
34. UCMJ art. 18, 10 U.S.C. § 818 (1964) (emphasis added). A concurrent grant
of jurisdiction to other military tribunals, such as military commissions and provost
courts, is contained in UCMJ art. 21, 10 U.S.C. § 821 (1964). For discussion of these
tribunals see Green, The Military Conmzission, 42 Am. J. IN'fL L. 832 (1948).
35. The unqualified phrase any person appears in other articles of the UCMJ. See
UCMJ art. 83, 10 U.S.C. § 883 (1964); UCMJ art. 104, 10 U.S.C. § 904 (1964); UCMJ
art. 106, 10 U.S.C. § 906 (1964). These sections, when compared with the other
punitive articles where the phrase any person is qualified by phrases such as subject
to this chapter, clearly indicate the congressional intent to apply a broader scope to
the provisions containing the unqualified words any person. See also MANUAL FOR
COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 183, 185 (rev. ed. 1969).
36. "Grave breaches.., shall be those involving any of the following acts, if 'com-
mitted against persons ... protected by the present Convention: wilful killing, torture
or inhumane treatment, . . . wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body
or health... ." Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, August 12, 1949, art. 147, [1955], 3 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365
[hereinafter cited as Geneva Convention-Civilians]. The protection afforded by the
Conventions to persons residing within the territorial limits of South Vietnam is ar-
guable. See Bond, Protection of Non-Combatants in Guerrilla Wars, 12 WAIC. & MARY
L. RiEv. 787 (1971). But see note 76 infra.
37. Geneva Convention-Civilians, supra note 36, art. 146. See also Geneva Conven-
tion Relative -to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, August 12, 1949, arts. 105-08,
[1955] 3 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364.
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PROBLEMS IN ASSERTING JURISDICTION
Federal District Courts
Although the Supreme Court has said that the criminal jurisdiction
of the federal district courts may be expanded to encompass extrater-
ritorial offenses committed by United States citizens, the Department
of Justice has continuously opposed such a plan.88  This executive
opposition stems not from abstract legal concepts, but from practical
considerations engendered by the sometimes irrational vagaries of inter-
national politics. 9
The end of World War II signaled the beginning of an era in which
the United States would for the first time maintain large military forces
in foreign countries." Along with this extensive foreign commitment
came an increased sensitivity to accusations of usurpation of the sov-
ereignty of the host nations. The propaganda conflicts of the following
two decades have increased this sensitivity to the point that it now
pervades every act of the United States government which might con-
ceivably be considered related to international affairs. Consequently,
the most cogent objection to the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction
by the federal district courts concerns the possibility of international
embarrassment which might accompany interference with the sover-
eignty of other nations.
As pointed out earlier, international law recognizes four basic theo-
ries which support the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by a nation.
However, the feasibility of the exercise of this jurisdiction must be
determined with a view to the general recognition by American courts
'chat the primary right to punish criminal offenders resides in the nation
wherein the offense was committed. 41 This superiority of territorial
jurisdiction is generally referred to as primary jurisdiction. The result
of the recognition of this primary right is that the United States may
undertake no prosecution without the consent, express or implied, of
the nation entitled to exercise primary jurisdiction.4 Agreements cur-
38. Letter from Frank J. Sherlock, supra note 25, enclosure at 1.
39. Id.
40. For an excellent discussion of the size and scope of the post-war commitment
of the United States in one area see Cleveland, How to Make Peace 'witb the Russians,
58 DEP'T STATE BULL. 687 (1968); Rostow, Europe and the United States-The Partner-
ship of Necessity, 58 DE'T. STATE BULL. 680 (1968).
41. Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, supra.note 14.
42. Recognition of this concept can be traced to Chief Justice Marshall's statement
that "[the jurisdiction of the nation, within its own territory, is necessarily exclusive
[Vol. 12:878
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rently in force between the United States and the nations in which
American servicemen and their civilian followers are present provide
for waiver of this primary right only in favor of United States military
authorities.43 The proposed extension of the criminal jurisdiction of
the federal district courts would require extensive renegotiation of
these agreements. These renegotiations would probably be viewed by
other nations as an overt attempt to extend United States sovereignty.
That the United States could not risk such an interpretation of its actions,
however incorrect, is patently obvious. 44
A further objection to the practicality of this exercise of extraterri-
torial jurisdiction by the federal district courts is that they would face
insurmountable problems in procuring witnesses. 45 The power to com-
pel the appearance of a witness at a judicial proceeding is essentially
a police power, and the proposition that one nation may not exercise
police power within the boundaries of another nation is an accepted
canon of international law.4, Although this canon may be varied by
agreement, those presently existing provide only for exercise of limited
police power by United States military authorities.47 Still the possibility
of renegotiating these agreements so that federal district courts, sitting
in the United States, might compel necessary witnesses who are foreign
nationals to appear at the trials of a United States citizen is doubtful. 48
The possibility that Congress might adopt this solution is of conse-
quence to former servicemen whose acts were committed prior to the
passage of an implementing statute only if the statute should contain a
provision allowing retroactivity. As previously noted, such a provision
would create a serious ex post facto question. Not all subsequent statutes
and absolute; it is susceptible of no limitation, not imposed by itself. . . . All exceptions,
therefore, to the full and complete power of a nation, within its own territories, must
be traced up to the consent of the nation. They can flow from no other legitimate
source." Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 135 (1812).
43. The United States has agreements of this type in effect with over fifty nations.
The most significant of these arrangements is with the members of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization. Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty
Regarding the Status of Their Forces, June 19, 1951, art. VII, para. 1(a), [1953] 2
U.S.T. 1792, T.I.A.S. No. 2846 [hereinafter cited as NATO SOFA].
44. Schuck, Trial of Civilian Personnel by Foreign Courts, 2 MmiTARY L. Rzv.
37,39 (1958).
45. Girard, The Constitution and Court-Martial of Civilians Accompanying the
Armed Forces-A Preliminary Analysis, 13 STANq. L. REv. 461, 509-11 (1961).
46. For an interesting example of the application of this principle see the case of
Sun-Yet-Sen. I L. OPPEN SIM, INTERrnATIOAL LAw-A TnAniSE 567 (3d ed. 1920).
47. Cf. NATO SOFA, supra note 43, art. VII, para. 6 (a).
48. Girard, supra note 45, at 509-10.
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enacted with an eye toward punishing an act are ex post facto laws,
however; the theory generally employed by the courts to save such
statutes is that there has merely been a change of forum.49 Should Con-
gress grant the requisite extraterritorial jurisdiction to the federal dis-
trict courts, it would be necessary to provide a code of substantive
crimes to be enforced by that jurisdiction. Since those individuals whose
acts were consumated prior to the enactment of such legislation com-
mitted offenses against the law of war and the UCMJ, the legislation
would have an excellent chance of surviving an ex post facto attack if
it were to incorporate by reference one or both of these codes of sub-
stantive crimes. This course seems neither desirable nor politically
palatable in the current context 0 A better solution to the problem of
providing a code of substantive crimes seems to be the adoption of cer-
tain offenses punishable by the federal district courts if committed within
the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States."
If the latter course were followed, not only would the forum have been
changed, but also, at least technically, so would have been the proscribed
conduct. Therefore, with respect to former servicemen currently con-
templating disclosure of personal activity, congressional action in this
area would be unlikely to pass muster under the ex post facto test.
It seems, therefore, that although the exercise of jurisdiction by fed-
eral district courts over former servicemen accused of having committed
war crimes while serving in a foreign nation is constitutionally permis-
sible, it is not a practical possibility at this time. Under these circum-
stances, it is necessary to consider whether past Supreme Court decisions
concerning the exercise of military jurisdiction over civilians foreclose
trial of these former servicemen before military tribunals.
Military Tribunals
The recent announcement by the Department of Defense that it had
been unable to find a way to prosecute former servicemen who were
involved in the My Lai(4) incident 52 might seem to render further dis-
cussion of the jurisdiction of military tribunals unnecessary. It must
be remembered, however, that such a pronouncement carries little
weight as guidance for judicial precedent and does not represent a def-
49. Cook v. United States, 138 U.S. 157 (1891).
50. Letter from Frank J. Sherlock, supra note 25, enclosure at 4.
51. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 81, 113, 114, 661, 662, 1111, 1112, 1113, 1363, 2031, 2032,
2111 (1964).
52. Chapman, supra note 4.
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initive adjudication of the constitutionality of the UCMJ provisions
discussed earlier. Thus the decision concerning the exercise of the
at least arguable jurisdictional grant of articles 18 and 21 of the UCMJ
may well be different under other executive leadership and a more
favorable political climate. When contemplating declarations of per-
sonal participation in incidents similar to My Lai (4), former servicemen
must weigh the possibility of such an executive change of heart against
the fact that under the UCMJ there is no statute of limitations for the
crime of murder.0 It is therefore imperative that these former service-
men have a clear understanding of the constitutional aspects of the war
crimes jurisdiction of military tribunals.
Congress may provide a system of tribunals for the maintenance of
discipline in the armed forces54 which is not subject to the grand jury
and jury trial guarantees of the fifth and sixth amendments of the United
States Constitution.55 Under exactly what circumstances these tribunals
may exercise jurisdiction over civilians, either former service members
or other civilians having a close connection with the armed services, is
not clear. At the outset,. it is recognized that the trial of any individual
not a service member by a military tribunal is in derogation of the spe-
cific guarantees of the Bill of Rights. 6 Therefore, any such exercise
of jurisdiction must be strictly circumscribed and limited to those in-
stances where it is essential to the maintenance of effective discipline of
the armed services.57
Although there had been earlier broad extensions of military jurisdic-
tion over civilian American citizens, the Supreme Court in 1866 an-
nounced that if the civilian courts were open and functioning there
could be no assertion of military jurisdiction over a civilian who had
never had any connection with the armed services. 8 In 1955, former
servicemen accused of certain offenses were classified as civilians en-
53. U.C.MJ. art. 43 (a), 10 U.S.C. § 843 (a) (1964).
54. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 123 (1866).
55. US. CoNsr. amend. V: "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury,
except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual
service in time of War or public danger...."
U.S. CoNsr. amend. VI: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed...."
56. Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.)
2 (1866).
57. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 33-36 (1957).
58. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 121 (1866).
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tided to the protections afforded by the fifth and sixth amendments.59
These decisions and those which followed denying military jurisdiction
over other civilians6° were based on two considerations. The most im-
portant of these was a determination of the necessity of the proposed
jurisdiction over civilians to the maintenance of discipline within the
service. The other involved an inquiry into whether Congress might
provide for the trial of these individuals in such a manner that their
constitutional rights might be protected. Mr. Justice Black stated, in
1955, that the legislative power of Congress over courts-martial juris-
diction was limited to "'the least possible power adequate to the end
proposed.' " 61
Examples of "the least possible power"
The latest expression by the Supreme Court restricting the reach of
military jurisdiction is found in the 1969 case, O'Callahan v. Parker.n
The Court in O'Callahan held that a serviceman on active duty who
committed an offense which was not service connected could not be
deprived of his fifth and sixth amendment rights by trial before a mili-
tary tribunal.6s This decision has raised a serious question as to the
power of military tribunals to try soldiers in overseas areas for crimes
which would not be service connected if committed within the con-
tinental United States.64 In post-O'Callahan decisions both the Court of
59. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
60. Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960) (non-capital crime,
civilian dependent); Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960) (capital crime, civilian em-
ployee); McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960) (non-capital
crime, civilian employee). See generally Girard, supra note 45.
61. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 US. 11, 23 (1955), quoting 'from
Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 230 (1821) (emphasis added). Compare
the quotation in Toth with the traditional statement of the extent of Congressional
power found in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 315, 420 (1819): "Let
the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means
which are appropriate which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited,
but consistent with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional."
62. 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
63. See generally Everett, O'Callahan v. Parker-Milestone or Millstone in Military
Justice?, 1969 D=a LJ. 853 (1969); Nelson & Westbrook, Court-Martial Jurisdiction
Over Servicemen for "Civilian" Offenses: An Analysis of O'Callahan v. Parker, 54
Mwnt. L. REv. 1 (1969); Note, Court-Martial jurisdiction: The Effect of O'Callaban
v. Parker, 11 Wm. & MARY L. Rav. 508 (1969).
64. See Everett, supra note 63, at 890-91.
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Military Appeals and the Court of Claims have sustained the jurisdiction
of military tribunals in such cases.6"
There are two theories which sustain the jurisdiction of military
tribunals to try cases arising in overseas areas and which are not service
connected. First, it may be argued that all the acts of servicemen as-
signed overseas are service connected. Alternatively, it may be said that
under the existing facts of international life, the Congress is exercising
the least possible power adequate to the end proposed: 6 The effective
disciplinary control of American soldiers on foreign soil in order to
preserve hospitable relations with the host country. The latter theory
seems to be the one upon which the courts have chosen to rely in sus-
taining this exercise of military jurisdiction."
The trial of offenders against the law of war has been traditionally
recognized as a legitimate function of military courts, whether the of-
fender be civilian68 or military.69 Furthermore, the mere fact that the
civilian offender claimed United States citizenship and protection of the
Bill of Rights has been held not to deprive military tribunals of juris-
diction where the individual was charged with a violation of the law of
war.70 Although these decisions were rendered prior to the major pro-
nouncements by the Supreme Court in United States ex rel. Toth v.
Quarles7l and Reid v. Covert,7 it seems that they are sustainable under
Mr. Justice Black's "least possible power" theory.
Jurisdiction over Former Servicemen as an Exercise of "the least pos-
sible power"
The United States has a paramount interest in preserving the reputa-
tion of its armed services for respect of the international agreements
65. Gallagher v. United States, 423 F.2d 1371 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 91 S. Cr. 58
(1970); United States v. Keaton, 19 U.S.C.MA. 64, 41 C.M.R. 64 (1969); United States
v. Easter, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 68, 41 C.M.R. 68 (1969); United States v. Stevenson, 19
U.S.C.M.A. 69, 41 C.M.R. 69 (1969); United States v. Higginbotham, 19 U.S.C.MA. 73,
41 C.M.R. 73 (1969)
66. See Everett, supra note 63, at 866-67.
67. Cf. Gallagher v. United States, 423 F.2d 1371, 1374-75 (Ct. Cl. 1970); United
States v. Keaton, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 64, 67, 41 C.M.R. 64, 67 (1969).
68. Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
69. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
70. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 36-41. See also United States v. Schultz, 1 U.S.C.MA.
512, 4 C.M.R. 104 (1952).
71. 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
72. 354 U.S. 1 (1956).
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concerning the permissible methods of conducting warfare. 3 Addition-
ally, the treaties concerning this subject impose a positive duty upon
all signatories to provide adequate machinery for the prevention and
punishment of war crimes by members of their armed forces. 74 Unfor-
tunately, the two-year service provisions of the Selective Service Act
of 196771 create a situation in which it is not only possible but likely
that servicemen who commit offenses against the law of war while
serving in enemy country 0 will be discharged prior to discovery of
their crimes.7 7 The nexus between allowing such offenders to go un-
punished and a possible breakdown in the effective discipline of the
armed services seems clearer than the general interest of the Congress
in seeing that all former servicemen are punished for crimes committed
while on active duty.78 This interest should afford Congress a broader
scope of power to subject former servicemen to military jurisdiction
than would be sustainable were the national interest of the United
States not so clear.
73. President Nixon has phrased this interest in the following manner:
... [W]e have 1,200,000 Americans who have been in Viet Nam. Forty
thousand of them have given their lives. Virtually all of them have helped
the people of Viet-Nam in one way or another....
Now, this record of generosity, of decency, must not be allowed to be
smeared and slurred because of this kind of incident. That is why I am
going to do everything I possibly can to see that all of the facts in this
incident are brought to light and that those who are charged, if they are
found guilty, are punished. Because if it is isolated, it is against our policy;
and we shall see to it that what these men did, if they did it, does not
smear the decent men that have gone to Viet-Nam in a very, in my opinion,
important cause.
President Nixon's News Conference of December 8, 61 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 617-18
(1969).
74. 'Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search for
persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave
breaches, and shall bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own
courts.. . ." Geneva Convention-Civilians, supra note 36, art. 146.
75. 50 U.S.C. § 454(b) (Supp. 1968).
76. ". . . [Tlhe country [is] none the less "enemy's country" and the territory
hostile, because it [is] harassed by insurrection against a sovereignty perfect in law,
rather than attacked or defended by a recognized belligerent." 24 Op. ATr'Y GE-.
570, 574 (1903).
77. Witness the fact that twenty-two out of approximately thirty-five participants
in the incident at My Lai(4) had been discharged from the service prior to the dis-
covery of their crime. Here suppression of the facts lasted only eighteen months.
78. The latter interest is definitely not sufficient to allow Congress to deprive former
servicemen of constitutional rights to grand jury indictment and trial by jury. United
States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
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Congress has only three alternative means available to insure that this
national interest is protected with respect to individuals who might be
discharged prior to discovery of their crimes. Initially, Congress might
provide for an extension of the jurisdiction of the federal district courts.
Secondly, military jurisdiction over these individuals might be preserved
by extending the term of service for individuals returning from combat
zones for a period during which exposure of violations of the law of
war is likely to occur. Finally, military tribunuals might exercise juris-
diction to try offenders against the law of war without regard to their
status, military or civilian. 7
An extraterritorial extension of criminal jurisdiction of the federal
district courts is not, for all practical purposes, available to the Congress.
The renegotiation of international agreements which would be neces-
sary to effectuate such an extension would run the risk of creating con-
siderable adverse feeling toward the United States. In light of the
current propaganda conflict between the United States and powerful
nations of other political persuasions, Congress cannot afford to adopt
such a course. It could not have been the intent of the Supreme Court
in 1955 to place Congress in the position of requiring a choice between
international embarrassment for failing to perform its treaty obliga-
tions8° and international condemnation for a supposed usurpation of the
sovereignty of less powerful nations.
The second alternative may be dismissed as involving an exercise of
congressional power over the individual merely to effectuate the main-
tenance of military jurisdiction. This is an exercise of power superior
to the mere statutory preservation of military jurisdiction over soldiers
who are allowed to leave the service upon return from combat zones.
The third alternative, that of providing for a statutory preservation
of military jurisdiction over former soldiers who are accused of having
committed war crimes while on active duty, should be constitutionally
sustainable as a congressional exercise of "the least possible power ade-
quate to the end proposed." 81 Such jurisdiction would be in consonance
with the American attitude that war criminals are somehow "beyond
the pale" and deserve to be treated only on the level of minimal human
decency rather than on the chivalrous level normally accorded to Ameri-
can citizens accused of more conventional criminal conduct."
79. See notes 34, 35 supra.
80. Note 74 supra.
81. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 23 (1955).
82. See Cowles, supra note 9.
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The Attitude of the Newly-Composed Supreme Court
The years of the Warren Court saw severe restriction placed upon
the extent of military jurisdiction. The majority decisions on this subject
during those years generally reflected a strong reaction to what Mr.
Justice Black characterized as a "harsh law which is frequently cast in
very sweeping and vague terms . . ," '3 rather than sound historical inter-
pretation of the constitutional matters in question.8 4 As the ultimate
direction of these decisions became obvious, strong dissents began to
appear culminating with Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent in O'Callahan v.
Parker.s5 In that case, Justice Harlan, joined by Justices Stewart and
White, would have found the congressional interest in punishing service
members for non-service-connected crimes sufficient to support an exer-
cise of military jurisdiction. 6
Chief Justice Burger expressed his views on the basic problems in-
volved in a dissent to the circuit court of appeals' decision in United
States ex rel. Guagliardo v. MeElroy.S? The court had reversed a lower
court decision denying habeas corpus to an Air Force civilian employee
at Nouasseur Air Depot, Morocco, who had been convicted of larceny
by a court-martial. The then Judge Burger summarized his position by
saying, "I am unable to join this kind of judicial negativism which
strikes down sound, historically supported legal action and leaves a
vacuum which cannot be filled." 88
It seems clear that on the question of whether the exercise of military
jurisdiction over former servicemen accused of war crimes is an exercise
of the least possible power adequate to the end proposed, the Chief Jus-
tice would join the dissenters in O'Callahan. On the other hand, four
members of the majority of O'Callahan remain on the Court." Any
decision in the matter would probably fall upon the shoulders of the
newest justice, Mr. Justice Blackmun, who coincidentally is the only
justice who has not expressed a definite opinion in a closely related case.
83. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 38 (1957).
84. United States ex rel. Guagliardo v. McElroy, 259 F.2d 927, 936-39 (D.C. Cir.
1958) (Burger, J., dissenting).
85. 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
86. "The Government, thus, has a proper concern in keeping its own house in
order, by deterring members of the armed forces from engaging in criminal misconduct
on or off base...." Id. at 282.
87. 259 F.2d 927, 933 (D.C. Cit. 1958) (Burger, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 940.
89. Justices Black, Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall.
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Prognostication as to the final decision of this all important justice will
be left for those with closer Delphic connections.90
CONCLUSION
The Department of Defense decision not to bring former servicemen
involved in the My Lai(4) incident to trial before military tribunals
places Congress in an awkward situation. Congress may now grant juris-
diction to the federal district courts to try these or similar cases. The
considerations of international policy and ex post facto application,
however, militate strongly against this action. Alternately, Congress
might revise the UCMJ to make the appropriate jurisdictional grant to
military tribunals unmistakably clear. Finally, Congress might simply
let the current situation continue in the hope that a new executive might
find more compelling the mandate to "... . take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed... ." " The current political climate certainly points
strongly toward the latter course of inaction. However, it must be
remembered that the decisions in Toth v. Quarles and Reid v. Covert
have created a jurisdictional vacuum which cannot, at least as a prac-
tical matter, be filled. The years of experience under the doctrine an-
nounced in these decisions have not resulted in a disastrous decline in
the conduct of American citizens overseas. However, certain events
during these years have served to point out the difficulties in filling the
jurisdictional voids thus created. The current complexion of the Supreme
Court seems to indicate that the extent of the voids already in existence
will be limited where possible. Seemingly, the grounds for such limita-
tion can easily be found where the nexus between the conduct to be
punished and the maintenance of effective discipline within the service
is clearer than in the earlier cases. This is currently the case when deal-
ing with former servicemen who are accused of war crimes.
To describe the current state of the law with respect to punishing
former servicemen for violations of the law of war as unclear, is to
indulge in the worst form of understatement. There are certainly some
who believe that the exercise of military jurisdiction over former service-
men would be unconstitutional under all circumstances.92 There are
90. Justice Blackmun seems to be inclined to join the minority in O'Callahan. See
the opinion of the Court, by Mr. Justice Blackmun in Relford v. Commandant, 91
S. Ct. 649 (1971).
91. U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 3.
92. Secretary of Defense Laird now makes a claim that Pentagon will bring
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others who would consider the recent disclaimer of jurisdiction by the
Department of Defense as a license to former servicemen to make
admissions without fear of prosecution. 3  In the final analysis, it is
through this maze of existing criminal jurisdiction, executive inaction,
possible congressional action, and ultimate judicial review that the for-
mer serviceman who wishes to disclose his own misconduct must con-
sider his ultimate decision.
CHARLES W. BOOHAR, JR.
to trial former U.S. soldiers who participated. Secretary Laird would do well
to read the Bill of Rights of our Constitution before making any claim that
Pentagon will bring to trial former soldiers who are now in civilian life.
Very definitely, Paul Meadlo of Indiana and others who admittedly shot
and killed some of these civilians on order of their officers and who are
no longer in the Army but are now in civilian life cannot be court-mar-
tialed....
The Supreme Court has definitely settled any claim that the Pentagon
can bring charges against former soldiers. The United States has no extra-
dition treaty whatever with Saigon militarist regime or with the Govern-
ment of South Vietnam. Therefore, Paul Meadlo and all others who par-
ticipated cannot be extradited from the United States and placed on trial
in South Vietnam. Therefore, Paul Meadlo and all these former soldiers
now in civilian life are definitely immune from prosecution for their part
in the Mylai massacre....
Secretary Laird knows, and Lieutenant Colonel Kennedy should know,
that the United States has no extradition treaty whatever with the Govern-
ment of South Vietnam. Therefore, civilians who were in the Army on
March 16, 1968, cannot be extradited. They cannot be placed on trial for
murder.
The Pentagon which has not given evidence of much brain power in
recent years cannot devise in 1969 any new laws that would permit the
trial, conviction, and imprisonment of any person now a civilian who
participated in a crime while in the Armed Forces in March of 1968.
115 CoNG. Rc. 39,584 (1969) (remarks of Senator Young).
93. The Citizen's Commission of Inquiry into U.S. War Crimes has predicted that
the recent Department of Defense announcement will "encourage thousands of Vietnam
veterans to come forward and relate their own experiences in Vietnam without fear
of criminal prosecution." Chapman, supra note 4, at col. 6.
